Mexico\u27s Democratic Transition: The Search for New Reform Coalitions by Wise, Carol
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 9 | Number 2 Article 6
2003
Mexico's Democratic Transition: The Search for
New Reform Coalitions
Carol Wise
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carol Wise, Mexico's Democratic Transition: The Search for New Reform Coalitions, 9 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 283 (2003)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol9/iss2/6
MEXICO'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION:
THE SEARCH FOR NEW
REFORM COALITIONS
Carol Wise*
N July 2000, after holding on to the presidency tenaciously for some
seventy years, Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) was finally turned out in an election that proved to be the
country's cleanest ever. Given the near universal trend toward democra-
tization in Latin America over the past two decades, this particular transi-
tion perhaps should have been regarded as par for the course. Yet, even
the most astute observers of Mexican politics refrained from officially de-
claring the region's longest standing semi-authoritarian regime the anach-
ronism that it had finally become. In part, this was due to the PRI's
uncanny survival skills and the time-tested ability of party leaders to re-
peatedly renovate the PRI's image and re-energize its core constituency.
But also, as the 1982 debt shocks marked the end of inward-looking state-
led development policies across the region and the rise of a market-based
internationalist orientation, some argued that despite the potential weak-
nesses of a dominant-party system, Mexico enjoyed "organizational ad-
vantages that can facilitate both the initiation and the consolidation of
economic reform."1
By all outward appearances, the PRI regarded itself in this same light:
few would dispute that the ruling party's original intentions were to
restructure radically the economy along market lines while indefinitely
retaining control over Mexican politics. However, the PRI's reliance on
old-style politics (e.g., clientelism, corruption, coercion) to forge an en-
tirely new economic model (e.g., liberalization, privatization and deregu-
lation) ultimately proved to be its undoing.2 Although the PRI's
autocratic style may have been propitious for launching market reforms,
their successful consolidation would require political skills (e.g., negotia-
tion, transparency, accountability) that did not come naturally to any of
the ruling party's various factions. This basic contradiction was first
*Carol Wise is Associate Professor in the School of International Relations at USC.
An earlier version of this article appeared in Carol Wise & Riordan Roett, eds.,
Post-Stabilization Politics in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 2003).
1. STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT KAUFMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMO-
CRATIC TRANSITIONS 306 (1995).
2. Francisco Panizza, Beyond Delegative Democracy: Old Politics and New Econom-
ics in Latin America, 32 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 737 (2000).
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driven home by the PRI's near loss of the hotly contested 1988 presiden-
tial election, as internal party rifts and a prolonged and severe post-debt
crisis adjustment threw the PRI's historic support base into serious ques-
tion. Despite the ruling party's remarkable comeback in the 1991 mid-
term elections and its legitimate victory in the presidential race of 1994,
the PRI's long secular decline at the polls finally translated into the 2000
presidential victory of opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, on the center-
right National Action Party (PAN) ticket.
There has been no shortage of explanations for the demise of authori-
tarian rule in post-debt crisis Latin America, although there are some
gaps when it comes to understanding the decline of a dominant single-
party system such as Mexico's. For example, in contrast to earlier transi-
tions from authoritarian rule in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Mexico's
transition has been a strictly civilian affair, albeit one with no prior epi-
sode of democratization from which to draw institutional strength.3
Moreover, rather than a series of elite negotiations that worked to bring
democracy to life, Mexico's transition represents the gradual unraveling
of old secretive corporatist pacts between the PRI and its mass bases that
had seemingly been set in stone since the 1930s. The escalation of politi-
cal economic crises since the 1970s certainly contributed to the decline of
elite politics, but the increased willingness of voters to opt for untried
political alternatives, and the rise of civil society, opposition parties, and a
more participatory mass politics, must also be factored in to Mexico's
transition equation.4 The current juncture, in short, is one in which vari-
ous new political alliances are being pursued in an increasingly more
transparent and party-competitive environment.
In this article I analyze the trend toward more vibrant, competitive,
and participatory politics in Mexico within the broader context of the ec-
onomic transformation that has underpinned this trend. But rather than
focusing on a single strand of cause and effect, I explore the ways in
which deep market restructuring since 1982 and gradual political reforms
interacted erratically over time to prompt an almost inadvertent demo-
cratic transition in Mexico. 5 And, I explore the ways in which Mexico's
political and economic liberalization have become, on balance, mutually
reinforcing in the post-reform era. In essence, market reforms shifted the
country's political calculus, as liberalization unleashed new poles of dyna-
mism across some regions and sectors, and redrew class lines according to
the new winners and losers in the market.
While better for some and worse for others, Mexico's economic trans-
formation over the past two decades also became the institutional locus
for a new political market-an alternative organizing principle for party
3. See Joseph L. Klesner, An Electoral Route to Democracy? Mexico's Transition in
Comparative Perspective, 30 COMP. POL. 477 (1998).
4. See VIKRAM K. CHAND, MEXICO'S POLITICAL AWAKENING (2001).
5. Pamela K. Starr, Monetary Mismanagement and Inadvertent Democratization in
Technocratic Mexico, 33 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 35 (1999).
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politics, civic action, and other forms of social mobilization. Against this
backdrop, periodic economic crises (e.g., 1982, 1994-95), and the PRI's
own self-inflicted political shocks (e.g., assassinations, electoral fraud,
government graft) clearly eroded the hegemony of single-party rule at the
federal level. At the state and municipal level, opposition parties were
also able to whittle away at the PRI's share of the regional vote by run-
ning performance-based campaigns and delivering on concrete issues. A
main blow for the PRI, amongst numerous others, was its failure to make
good on its reform promises at the microeconomic level, after unrealisti-
cally raising the electorate's expectations about upward mobility.
In order to set the proper political economic baseline for this discus-
sion, I begin with a brief analysis of Mexican politics and economic policy
prior to the 1982 debt shocks. A second section traces the PRI's electoral
decline from 1982-1988, the flip side of this decline being the unprece-
dented ascendance of a pocketbook or normal economic vote in Mexico.
A third section examines the PRI's revival from 1988-1994, and with it a
brief resurrection of the electorate's good will. The fourth section charts
the rise of truly competitive politics in Mexico since 1994, and in doing so
identifies the demand for another generation reforms as a key contribut-
ing factor. The final section analyzes the efforts of the Fox administration
to reconcile the completion of the remaining reform tasks with the much
higher levels of political competition and democratic accountability now
present in Mexico. While it is too soon to tell, political responses since
the transfer of executive power from the PRI to the PAN suggest that no
one party can continue to count on the bloc of votes that had historically
been reserved for the PRI. Rather, as in most democratizing regimes,
Mexican voters now appear to be opting for substance over symbol, for
concrete performance over hollow promises of future gains.
I. PRE-REFORM POLITICS IN MEXICO: THE SHADOW
OF THE PAST
Since its inception in 1929, the PRI controlled the presidency, the con-
gress, and most locally elected positions by linking itself, both materially
and symbolically, with the nationalistic and distributional goals of the
Mexican revolution. Early on, PRI leaders reorganized Mexican society
along sectoral lines (labor, business, peasants) and tied each unit closely
to the party through its complete control over the federal budget. As this
political arrangement became intermingled with the launching of the Im-
port-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model in the 1950s, PRI politi-
cians became quite adept at administering various incentives and
disincentives to keep their followers on board and their enemies in check.
The latter included opposition parties, which were circumscribed tightly.
A main exception was the center-right PAN that came to play the role of
the loyal opposition by colluding with the PRI from time to time in con-
gress. The PRI also proved to be highly resilient and skillful in changing
2003]
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with the times, as the party has cast itself in a new image at numerous
critical turning points since the 1940s.
Though a distinctly non-democratic arrangement, by scheduling fed-
eral, state, and local elections at regular intervals, Mexico was able to
project an image of competitive politics and, thereby, distance itself from
the more starkly authoritarian military regimes that had emerged in the
Southern Cone during the 1960s and 1970s. This is not to say that the
PRI resisted the same kinds of authoritarian tactics that characterized
these other regimes. Dissenters and critics were invariably dealt a heavy
blow, as witnessed in the government's violent response to university
protestors in the late 1960s and to the numerous opposition journalists,
politicians, and intellectuals that met untimely deaths. During the "Stabi-
lizing Development" era of low inflation, generous state largesse, and
high growth rates-averaging over 7 percent annually in the 1950s, 1960s,
and even the more volatile 1970s, the PRI was able to distract the electo-
rate from its darker side via government patronage and constant refer-
ence to the ideals of the Mexican revolution.
Yet, this nostalgic politics of prosperity in semi-authoritarian guise be-
gan to lose its appeal in the 1970s, as reflected in the PRI's declining
electoral performance in presidential and congressional elections. Table
1 (see Appendix A) shows that at the presidential level, the PRI's share
of votes dropped from nearly 87 percent in the 1976 race to barely over
50 percent in 1988.6 Congressional elections mirrored this trend, as the
PRI's share of seats in the house of deputies fell from a little over 85
percent in 1976 to just more than 50 percent in 1988.7 Under conditions
of authentic political competition and accountability, this would appear
to be the very point at which voters' prospective affinity toward the PRI
began to shift: what was best for the nation or the party was gradually
becoming less important than one's own immediate economic well-being.
But such assessments are muddied by the complete lack of transparency,
including the crude state of public opinion polls at this time, and the
PRI's astute ability to manipulate "revolutionary" symbols and put its
own favorable spin on the most dismal of events. At any rate, while Mex-
icans may have begun voting with their feet in the 1980s, rumors of the
PRI's pending death would turn out to be premature.
There are other contributing explanations for the electoral slippage
that comes through so clearly in Table 1 (see Appendix A). First, as de-
tailed in Table 2 (see Appendix B), was a series of political reforms
launched by the PRI beginning in 1978-gestures meant to revive lagging
party support after PRI presidential candidate Josd L6pez Portillo ran
completely uncontested in 1976. Meant to counter the rising political ap-
athy but also to legitimize the PRI's self-proclaimed birthright to the
6. PRI Records Worst Ever Poll Results, Latin American Regional Reports: Mexico
and Central America, Aug. 18, 1988, at 2.
7. Joseph L. Klesner, Electoral Politics and Mexico's New Party System, Paper deliv-
ered at the LASA Meeting, Chicago, Sept. 24-26, 1998, at 37.
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presidency, these early political reforms sought to encourage higher levels
of political contestation at the congressional level. For example, in 1978 a
total of seven political parties were officially recognized for the purposes
of electoral participation, and the house of deputies was expanded from
300 to 400 seats. The additional 100 seats, increased to 200 in 1986, were
designated according to each party's respective share of the total vote, as
opposed to the previous majority vote that had always locked in the
PRI's victory in congressional races. 8
A second shorthand explanation for the ruling party's electoral slip-
page was the increased sophistication of the electorate under the coun-
try's long post-war economic expansion, and the flight of voters in
response to the chronic economic stress that marked the late 1970s. On
the first count, higher literacy rates and the emergence of a Mexican mid-
dle class proper rendered the PRI and its bullying tactics less politically
appealing. On the second count, certainly the mounting crisis made it
more difficult to ignore that, in fact, the PRI had never delivered on the
distributional commitments that had long been the cornerstone of its de-
velopment program. Thus, Mexicans were finally beginning to cast eco-
nomic votes, although disenchantment with the regime itself, including
the PRI's repressive and underhanded authoritarian tactics, had also
poisoned the electoral waters. 9
II. THE RISE OF THE "ECONOMIC VOTE" AND THE PRI'S
ELECTORAL DECLINE, 1982-1988
Up until the 1980s the PRI had refined political spending to an art,
with the usual manipulations of fiscal and monetary policy around elec-
tion time and the thick web of patronage that maintained the party's
broad constituency. The severity of the 1982-1983 external shocks and
the explosion of debt service payments in the fiscal accounts constricted
these options more drastically than ever before. As Table 3 (see Appen-
dix C) shows, the dire stabilization challenges inherited by the incoming
De la Madrid administration (1982-1988) persisted through the entire sex-
enio, regardless of the consecutive reform packages that sought to tackle
inflation and reactivate the economy. With GDP growth plummeting to
an annual average of less than 1 percent under De la Madrid, a fiscal
deficit averaging around 12 percent of the GDP, and inflation approach-
ing triple digits, this period marked the end of the PRI's ability to main-
tain any semblance of its old-style politics of prosperity. It also meant
that the perpetuation of PRI electoral "victories" would require addi-
tional non-material resources, namely, coercion and fraud.
8. Chappell Lawson, Mexico's New Politics: The Elections of 1997, 8 J. DEMOCRACY
13, 14 (1997). The author notes that "[t]he complex formula for assigning those
two hundred proportional-representation seats means that one party can achieve a
majority either by winning more than 250 of the SMDs [single-member districts] (a
nearly impossible feat), or by securing at least 42.2 percent of the overall tally."
9. JORGE I. DOMtNGUEZ & JAMES A. MCCANN, DEMOCRATIZING MEXICO: PUBLIC
OPINION AND ELECTORAL CHOICES 28 (1996).
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The main focus of attention under De la Madrid was macroeconomic,
and the tone was decidedly orthodox. With the public debt approaching
an astronomical 45 percent of GDP, austerity was the order of the day.
Real public spending dropped by more than 20 percent and public invest-
ment as a percentage of GDP fell by almost 3 percentage points. By rais-
ing tariffs on imports and steadily devaluing the peso, the economic team
was able to expand exports and garner the foreign exchange necessary to
cover the country's mammoth debt service payments-now approaching
20 percent of GDP-at least until this stopgap measure had run its course
by 1985. Amidst ongoing debates within international financial circles as
to whether these grave difficulties represented a problem of liquidity or
outright insolvency, average Mexicans readily confirmed the latter. The
most immediate political impact of the economic crisis was to deepen rifts
that had already appeared between traditional societal actors and to cre-
ate new divisions under the full weight of the adjustment burden.
The deepest rift centered on the De la Madrid administration's com-
mitment to couple the orthodox macroeconomic stabilization program
with a more penetrating set of market reforms (liberalization, privatiza-
tion, deregulation). Debates concerning the proper sequencing of market
reforms and the advisability of implementing these simultaneously with
an aggressive macroeconomic stabilization program prior to achieving ef-
ficiency gains were just getting underway when Mexico's reform effort
gained momentum. Yet, despite a growing consensus that a stabilization
program could be derailed by an ill-timed introduction of deep structural
reforms (e.g., the liberalization of the capital account before the banking
system had been modernized) few policymakers in Latin America of the
1980s found the economic breathing space necessary to heed this ad-
vice. 10 Such was the case with the new generation of U.S.-trained techno-
crats that had arrived in 1982 with the De la Madrid administration.
The PRI itself split over this issue, as former PRI member Cuauhtrmoc
Cirdenas joined with other disaffected party members to form the Party
of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), which went on to be the first party
to credibly challenge the PRI's hold on the presidency.1 Apart from
their distrust of the staunch market rhetoric under De la Madrid, those
politicians and constituents that left the PRI with Cirdenas reflected the
ways in which the PRI's support base had gradually changed. By this
time, a typical PRI loyalist came from the less industrialized parts of the
country where illiteracy rates were high and access to quality education
and to urban-based media channels were still low. 12 In contrast, the PRD
attracted a growing contingent within the PRI that was better educated
and politically informed, and it became a halfway house of sorts for the
10. Sebastian Edwards, The Order of Liberalization of the External Sector in Develop-
ing Countries, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 156 (Princeton Univ., 1984).
11. For a full account of the rise of the PRD, see KATHLEEN BRUHN, TAKING ON
GOLIATH: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LEFT PARTY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DE-
MOCRACY IN MEXICO (1997).
12. Klesner, supra note 7, at 23-30.
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growing army of urban informal sector workers that had been ejected
from the countryside due to massive cuts in rural spending.' 3 Neither of
these diverse constituencies was convinced that the liberal economic
strategy being touted by PRI technocrats was in Mexico's best long-term
interests or that the combination of a market shock and a very gradual
political opening would necessarily work in their favor.
This division between those with nationalist inward policy preferences
and those with aggressive economic liberalization goals similarly was evi-
dent within the PRI's traditional corporatist bases (i.e., small business,
labor, and peasants) as the deepening of trade liberalization from
1985-1987 drove a wedge between the PRI and these groups. As the ISI
model was dismantled, so too were the PRI's corporatist ties with those
workers, producers, and peasants who depended on the domestic market
and demanded a return to protectionism and state support. However, the
response of those internationalized segments of the private sector was the
reverse: stung by the L6pez Portillo administration's nationalization of
the banks in 1982 and hurt by the high transaction costs under ISI, these
outward-oriented producers took advantage of exchange rate devaluation
under De la Madrid and increasingly engaged in exports and intra-indus-
try trade in the 1980s. 14 It was this contingent that began clamoring for
measures that would further streamline the economy and enhance trad-
able producers' competitive position in the North American market; and,
of course, it was this segment of the Mexican private sector that eventu-
ally bonded with the PRI technocrats during the subsequent Salinas ad-
ministration (1988-1994) and went on to forge the powerful government-
business coalition that secured Mexico's entry into the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Most incumbent parties would have feared the worst under such cir-
cumstances, especially in light of the economic malaise and the internal
bickering that preceded the election, and the PRI was no exception. 15
These fears were partially realized. Despite the PRD's lack of equal ac-
cess to the media or to state campaign financing, the Cirdenas campaign
hit a civic nerve with those more vulnerable voters whose wages had been
slashed since 1982 and who could not identify with the technocratic likes
of De la Madrid or the PRI's 1988 hand-picked presidential candidate,
Carlos Salinas. Early reports of Cfrdenas's heavy win in Mexico City (49
percent) was the first electoral jolt in 1988, prompting PRI operatives to
quickly jam the vote-counting system so as to produce a Salinas "victory."
The PAN, too, saw a slight jump in its standing in the presidential tally,
from around 15 percent of the vote in 1982 to 17 percent in 1988. But
even the PRI's blatant vote tampering in 1988 could not prevent the op-
13. Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, State Policy, Distribution and Neoliberal Reform in
Mexico, 29 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 419 (1997).
14. Carol Wise, Latin American Trade Strategy at Century's End, 1 Bus. & PoL. 117
(1999).
15. Jorge Buendfa, Economic Reform, Public Opinion and Presidential Approval in
Mexico, 1988-1993, 29 CoMp. POL. STUD. 566, 574 (1996).
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position's gains in the chamber of deputies, where the PRI lost the two-
thirds majority vote that it had always relied on to single-handedly amend
the constitution. The hemorrhaging of the ruling party's left-wing constit-
uency, and also the losses to the PAN on the right-leaning side, reflected
a new dilemma for the PRI: reconciling with those within the PRI's left-
wing who argued that market reforms had gone too far and the more
conservative-minded within the PRI who insisted that economic liberali-
zation had not gone far enough. The efforts to resolve this dilemma
would become the defining feature of the Salinas sexenio.
As for the De la Madrid sexenio, hindsight shows that, if given a second
chance, the policy choices probably could not have been much different.
Given the structural distortions inherent in the ISI model, the magnitude
of the debt overhang, and the long capital drought of the 1980s, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how the PRI could have avoided the wrath of the electo-
rate. The outright policy failures and the country's new flirtation with
three-digit inflation did prompt a slight departure from orthodoxy with
the launching of an anti-inflationary "Economic Solidarity Pact" in De-
cember 1987. This Pact set a tight monetary and fiscal policy and, follow-
ing a one-shot devaluation, pegged the peso closely to the U.S. dollar. At
the same time, tariffs on trade were reduced to an all-time low. 16 The
unorthodox elements of the Pact were the wage and price guidelines,
based on periodic tripartite consultations between government, business,
and labor. As the next section will show, the Pact provided a badly
needed breathing space, a middle ground of sorts, to enable the ruling
party to begin addressing its critics from both the left and the right. The
fumbling of this opportunity would finally work to quicken the pace of
the country's political opening, much to the PRI's own surprise and
chagrin.
III. THE SALINAS REVIVAL: THE ELECTORATE'S RETURN
TO THE PRI FOLD, 1988-1994
While clearly not the electorate's, or even the national-level PRI's, fa-
vored son in 1988 Salinas skillfully revamped the party and began remak-
ing it in yet another new image immediately upon taking office. As the
PRI's support base dwindled to the least educated and least skilled voters
in the less industrialized areas, Salinas relied on a combination of state-
craft, symbolism, and myth to re-attract a much broader constituency. At
the level of statecraft, Salinas restored internal party discipline and reined
in the intransigent old guard by doling out not-so-subtle incentives. At
the same time, Salinas cemented his relationship with key representatives
of business and labor by prolonging the Economic Solidarity Pact negoti-
ations through his entire term. Simultaneously, he launched
PRONASOL, a demand-based social safety net program that allocated
16. Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free
Trade Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 459, 460-62 (1994).
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some $14 billion for infrastructure and assorted support programs from
1988-1994 for those communities that were particularly hard hit by the
post-1982 stabilization measures.' 7 Salinas's success in negotiating Mex-
ico's entry into NAFTA and the OECD also displayed a new kind of
leadership and vision, especially in comparison with his more recent PRI
predecessors.
The analysis thus far has shown that options for political spending di-
minished by the mid-1980s, and that a main oversight by the PRI was to
assume that its core base would remain loyal even in the absence of the
usual material incentives. Having been sufficiently punished by voters in
1988, the task now was to somehow soften the blows of structural adjust-
ment even though the demands for a strict fiscal and monetary policy
were still present under the threat of renewed inflation. While the budg-
etary ax had fallen the hardest under De la Madrid, public spending and
investment were still constricted as the overall fiscal balance turned to a
surplus in 1993-1994. Yet, although political spending remained tight,
Salinas succeeded beyond anyone's expectations in staging a PRI come-
back in the 1991 mid-term elections (see Table 1, Appendix A) by relying
on non-material incentives-in fact, this is the point at which symbol and
myth came brilliantly into play.
In terms of symbolism, Salinas was masterful at linking market reforms
with the ideals of the Mexican revolution. As the economic policy tasks
post-1988 focused more intently on the completion of deep structural re-
forms, liberalization was cast as another phase in the country's moderni-
zation process-entailing Mexico's painful but necessary insertion into
global markets. For example, the financial sector was more fully liberal-
ized and deregulated and the eighteen domestic banks that had been na-
tionalized by the outgoing L6pez Portillo administration (1976-1982)
were sold off to the private sector, as were the state airline, steel, and
telephone companies. The agricultural sector was similarly liberalized,
and the state's longstanding ejido system of rural landholdings was dis-
mantled. The public sector itself was further streamlined and even the
sacrosanct petroleum industry saw some privatization around the fringes
in processing and related services.
Apart from the Salinas team's ideological zeal for the market, these
structural reforms obviously had a practical side: to entice foreign invest-
ment back into Mexico after the severe capital shortage of the 1980s.
Mexico's 1986 accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) simultaneously signaled the country's intentions to seek stronger
multilateral economic ties and to diversify from its strong historical de-
pendence on the U.S. market. Yet, with new competition from a liberal-
izing bloc of capital-starved countries in Eastern Europe, Mexico quickly
found itself back in the arms of U.S. investors. The rest of this story is
17. Denise Dresser, Bringing the Poor Back In: National Solidarity as a Strategy of
Regime Legitimation, in TRANSFORMING STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: THE NA-
TIONAL SOLIDARITY STRATEGY 143 (Wayne Cornelius et al. eds., 1994).
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already history: in 1990 Mexico successfully petitioned the U.S. and Ca-
nadian governments for its negotiated entry into the 1989 Canada-U.S
Free Trade Agreement; these negotiations were completed in 1992, and
the NAFTA was launched on January 1, 1994. The Salinas team's aggres-
sive pursuit of NAFTA, although still politically anathema to the PRI's
traditional "dinosaur" wing, was then framed as a main venue for com-
pleting this next phase of revolutionary development.
By offering new kinds of compensation to those private interests who
were essential for market reforms to succeed, including lucrative oppor-
tunities in the privatization bidding process and unprecedented political
access to the omnipotent office of the executive, Salinas readily con-
vinced the winners in the liberalization game that their gains would be
unlimited. For the mass of losers, reflected in the distributional data in
Table 4 (see Appendix D), PRONASOL became the PRI's main objec-
tive, a program whose insignia bore a blend of the Mexican flag and the
PRI logo. Although PRONASOL expenditures never surpassed 1 per-
cent of GDP from 1989-1994, Salinas similarly was able to convince liber-
alization's losers that their losses would be temporary and, even then, the
PRI had every intention of taking care of its own.
A remaining challenge was to bring a politically disillusioned and eco-
nomically besieged middle class back into the PRI's fold, especially those
more educated urban voters that had sided with the PRD in 1988. Again,
statecraft and symbolism saved the day. Salinas initiated another round
of electoral reforms meant to rectify and prevent a repeat of the shameful
infractions of 1988. As Table 2 (see Appendix B) shows, Salinas actually
phased in political reforms over the course of his administration in such a
way as to save the most penetrating measures for last. Nevertheless, the
federal election code (COFIPE) was amended, an independent Federal
Electoral Institute (IFE) was established, and a myriad of measures were
passed to promote transparency and authentic electoral competition. 18
However, in order to credibly project an image of a transformed PRI
that now championed democracy, the party would obviously have to take
its first step toward conceding losses at the gubernatorial level and in
races for the federal senate. Such gestures mainly applied to the less-
threatening loyal opposition, for example, the PRI's acceptance of a PAN
governorship in the northern state of Baja, California in 1989. Given its
far more conservative and business-oriented constituency it was doubtful,
at least from the PRI's standpoint, that the PAN could actually out-dis-
tance the PRI any time soon. The same could not be said for the consist-
ently more disloyal PRD, which sprung directly from the disgruntled left-
wing ranks of the PRI. The PRD thus was subjected to continued harass-
ment and fraud in numerous state-level contests. This superficial manipu-
lation of the opposition and the contrived electoral competition that
18. Lawson, supra note 8, at 14-15.
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resulted from it was sufficient to win Salinas the political capital neces-
sary to stage a PRI comeback.
Again, the diminished opportunities for traditional political spending
meant that the economic challenge of courting the middle class was also
dealt with in symbolic terms. The distributional trends in Table 4 (Ap-
pendix D) confirmed that it would require more than the PRI's time-
worn promises of future prosperity to win back some of this vote. This
occurred when the anchored exchange rate set under the Economic Soli-
darity Pact in December 1987 and maintained according to a tight crawl-
ing peg until the peso literally imploded in December 1994. This,
combined with the government's encouragement of an unprecedented ex-
pansion of consumer credit (e.g., personal credit cards), helped induce
this very feeling of renewed prosperity. As the peso gradually appreci-
ated, and import liberalization allowed for a flood of luxury goods, the
average consumer's dollar purchasing power soared. 19 After the previous
decade of pent-up demand, a consumer-spending spree was well under-
way by the time of the 1991 mid-term elections.
The appearance of a buoyant reactivation helped shift the 1991 vote
away from the pocketbook concerns of 1988 and back toward the atti-
tudes that had underpinned earlier PRI victories. Regardless of their cur-
rent situation, including the continued stress within domestic wage and
labor markets, the average citizen had been convinced that the Mexican
economy was back on track. Moreover, Salinas had persuaded a solid
majority of voters that their station in life would indeed improve in the
near future, but only if they continued to cast their fate with the PRI. As
the PRD had splintered into warring factions by this time, it failed to pick
up a single seat in the house of deputies in 1991. Whereas the PAN en-
joyed the second highest gains, the PRI took 320 seats in the house and
all but one contested seat in the federal senate. Even more importantly,
Salinas' popularity and high approval rating of 65 percent in 1990-1991
meant "people who were positively inclined toward the president and the
PRI tended to support reform regardless of their views of the econ-
omy."'20 The PRI rode this victory all the way through to the passage of
NAFTA by the U.S. Congress in late 1993 and to a reasonably legitimate
win over the opposition in the 1994 presidential election.
Yet, in the build-up to the 1994 race, Salinas's ingenuous use of state-
craft and symbolism began to wear thin. This is so in at least three re-
spects. First, despite the repeated insistence of PRI technocrats
concerning the viability of the macroeconomic strategy and the sus-
tainability of a fixed exchange rate, some well-respected independent
analysts now were arguing that the mediocre growth rates and rising un-
19. Manuel Pastor, Pesos, Policies, and Predictions, in THE POST-NAFTA POLITICAL
ECONOMY: MEXICO AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 119 (Carol Wise ed., 1998).
20. Robert R. Kaufman & Leo Zuckermann, Attitudes toward Economic Reform in
Mexico: The Role of Political Orientations, 92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 359, 369 (1998).
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employment stemmed from the lack of a competitive currency regime.21
Beneath the veneer of economic boom, real growth rates hovered at a
mediocre 3.7 percent average under Salinas, and worrisome pressures
were already building in the external accounts. The combination of uni-
lateral trade liberalization and a fixed exchange rate, although effective
for holding inflation down to single-digit levels by 1994, had pushed the
trade deficit from $7.5 billion in 1990 to more than $24 billion in 1992.
Moreover, while some foreign direct investment had returned under the
thrust of Mexico's financial market opening, the 1989 Brady debt restruc-
turing, and the privatization program, more footloose portfolio flows
(bonds, stocks, equities) still outpaced FDI by at least six-fold. As the
currency continued to appreciate under the pressure of high interest rates
and heavy portfolio inflows, these growing imbalances reflected the ex-
tent to which the earlier stabilization measures and structural reforms
were now conflicting.
As the economy moved into a recession in mid-1993, economy minister
Pedro Aspe remained adamant that any distortions in relative prices due
to the peso's appreciation could be corrected through rapid productivity
gains. However, it takes time to realize such improvements, something
the Salinas administration was running out of when there was a clear
need to shift tracks during 1993-1994. By postponing the devaluation,
and borrowing heavily to defend the exchange rate, the Salinas team did
win the double victories of NAFTA accession and the presidency. But
the PRI technocrats also gambled with the country's welfare, and both
sides lost in the long run: during the three sexenios that spanned the coun-
try's market restructuring, real per capita income gains would register a
paltry 4 percent increase. Relative income trends were equally dismal, as
Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato note in their chapter: "Mexico was
the only country where mobility did not increase in the 1980s and
1990s." 2 2
A second crack in the Salinas facade lay in the realm of the PRI's com-
mitment to democratization. Although the 1991 mid-term race was
flawed by further allegations of vote tampering, the 1994 presidential
election was clean by comparison-except for the PRI's continued ma-
nipulation of media access and campaign financing laws. 23 While the
party did concede politely to some PAN victories at the gubernatorial and
congressional levels during the Salinas term (even when there were some
legitimate reasons to question an authentic PAN "victory"), rarely did an
21. For an excellent review of both sides of this debate, see Francisco Gil Dfaz &
Agustin Carstens, Pride and Prejudice: The Economics Profession and Mexico's
Financial Crisis, in MEXICO 1994: ANATOMY OF AN EMERGING-MARKET CRASH
165 (Sebastian Edwards & Mois6s Nafm eds., 1997).
22. Carol Graham & Stefano Pettinato, Assessing Hardship and Happiness: Trends in
Mobility and Expectations in the New Market Economies, CSED Working Paper
No. 7, Oct. 1988 (The Brookings Institution).
23. CHAND, supra note 4, at 239. Chand notes that a first campaign finance law was
passed in 1993 that set individual contributions to a given political party at the
peso equivalent of $666,667 per contributor!
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electoral face off between the PRI and the PRD end without fierce pro-
cedural disputes that sometimes required direct presidential intervention.
Even within the ruling party, factional rifts over political liberalization
were turning violent, as witnessed in the still unresolved assassination of
PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March 1994. The
mounting corruption involving those affiliated with the party at the high-
est levels and the complete lack of accountability with regard to economic
policymaking and budgetary discretion confirmed that the PRI had no
intention of democratizing Mexico beyond the more formalistic electoral
measures that had been implemented. Salinas, in retrospect, did at least
lay the groundwork for further political competition as part of his exit
strategy. By delaying political reforms until the end of his term and
avoiding the political risks of democratization gone wild akin to the pat-
tern in the former Soviet bloc, the outgoing president sought to carve out
his future role as an international statesman without getting any further
bogged down in his own state's political turmoil.
Finally, the repeated promises of future prosperity under the PRI,
while successful in rallying the party's remarkable comeback in 1991 and
1994, could not have been further off. The Salinas team had oversold
NAIFTA as the cornerstone of a new economic model that, when joined
with policies like privatization and deregulation would boost real incomes
and expand opportunities for job creation. Yet the structural transforma-
tion of the Mexican political economy over the past two decades has been
a far cry from the trickle down success story proffered by the Salinas
technocrats. Mexico's widespread liberalization has indeed triggered a
dynamic pattern of investment and export-led growth; however, Table 4
(Appendix D) also shows how uneven these gains have been: the richest
10 percent of households increased their share of monetary income by 6
percent between 1984 and 2000, while every other docile saw a decrease
in household income over the same time period. As a shorthand explana-
tion, I would attribute these highly regressive returns, first, to the reckless
macroeconomic policy errors of the outgoing Salinas team; and second, to
the PRI's rather disingenuous reliance on the market to foster
microeconomic change. In light of the high levels of pre-existing income
inequality, the education and skill deficit of the Mexican workforce, and
the lack of a competitive productive structure, it was doubtful from the
start that significant widespread income gains could occur without a more
concerted set of public policies to support such change.
IV. MORE FALSE PROMISES: THE DERAILING OF SECOND-
PHASE REFORMS, 1994-2000
By the 1994 election, many of the myths just discussed still had not
been debunked. The PRI was thus able to stage a respectable comeback
in the mid-1994 presidential race, obtaining 60 percent of the congres-
sional seats and Ernesto Zedillo took the executive office with just under
2003]
296 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
49 percent of the vote.2 4 The PAN placed second in the presidential race
and increased its share of congressional seats from roughly 18 percent in
1991 to about 24 percent in 1994. The PRI had effectively poached some
of the PAN's private sector constituents in the country's northern states
by running its own business candidates, forging an alliance with the big
export-oriented financial-industrial groups, and securing Mexico's entry
into NAFTA.25
But another important aspect of the PRI's 1994 presidential victory
was the decline of the PRD candidate's vote to 16.5 percent. Here, too,
Salinas had stolen Cirdenas's thunder. The PRI's selective channeling of
PRONASOL expenditures to those poorer states that had favored the
PRD in 1988 helped restore its original image as the main benefactor of
the poor. Electoral analysts remain divided as to whether the PRI's
PRONASOL spending actually regained support for the ruling party or
merely stopped the bleeding of votes to the PRD. At any rate, by paint-
ing the PRD as socialist radicals and harassing its candidates at every
possible electoral turn, the PRI readily capitalized on the internal up-
heaval already underway within the PRD coalition.
In the short term, the 1994 elections also helped to legitimate the PRI's
democratization strategy: enough transparency and competition to ap-
pear fair, but not so much that the PRI would be unseated from the exec-
utive office. Nevertheless, and regardless of the ruling party's slow pace
in the transition to democracy, the cumulative electoral reforms that had
been passed since 1978 were beginning to have a positive effect on politi-
cal liberalization. In particular, more recent reforms such as a new fraud-
proof voter registration card, accurate voter registration lists, and the un-
precedented decision to allow international election observers into the
country helped spur the highest voter turnout (nearly 78 percent) ever.26
Close oversight by Mexican pro-democratization organizations like the
highly esteemed Civic Alliance and by the domestic and foreign press
further enhanced the image of the 1994 election as a clean race. Presum-
ably, the enthusiasm with which Mexicans responded reflected not only
the possibility of one's vote truly counting, but also the more authentic
chances of electing candidates outside of the ruling party.
Electoral politics aside, 1994 turned out to be Mexico's annus hor-
ribilis. All at once, it seemed, the political ramifications of deep market
reforms suddenly were felt. From the January uprising of the Zapatista
guerrillas in Chiapas, to two high-level PRI assassinations in March and
September (the aforementioned Colosio hit, plus the killing of PRI secre-
tary-general Jos6 Francisco Ruiz Massieu just six months later) to the
badly managed December 1994 peso devaluation, the Salinas image of
24. Too Good to be True?, Latin American Mexico and NAFTA Report, Sept. 29,
1994, at 2.
25. CHAND, supra note 4, at 52. The author notes that in states governed by the PAN
(Baja, California, Chihuahua, and Guanajuato) Zedillo won twice as many votes as
the PAN presidential candidate.
26. Id. at 51.
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political stability and liberalization-driven prosperity was shattered by
year's end. The Zedillo campaign, launched haphazardly in the wake of
Colosio's murder, addressed the electorate's growing concerns over re-
cession, unemployment, and social hardship. Through a subtle election-
year expansion of credit channeled into the economy via the state devel-
opment banks and an easing of interest rates the outgoing Salinas team
had engineered a 4.4 percent growth rate in 1994.27 Ostensibly, the in-
coming Zedillo team would harness this renewed growth to launch "sec-
ond-phase" market reforms as discussed in the introduction to this
volume - i.e., the following up of earlier market measures with policies
meant to strengthen institutions, assure competition and oversight, and
more aggressively target a wide range of human capital needs. 2 8
Thus, in a rather inadvertent and de facto manner, Mexico's economic
restructuring unfolded in three phases. First, the tasks of economic stabi-
lization fell to the De la Madrid team. Then, the structural adjustment
was relegated to the Salinas team. Finally, in principle, Colosio was to
take up the challenges of completing and fine-tuning the market reforms
that had been implemented by his predecessors. Certainly there was no
shortage of items to tackle on the second-phase reform agenda. On the
institutional front, the status quo was simply no longer viable in such cru-
cial areas as judicial procedures, public "security," low tax collections,
and the country's antiquated labor market rules. Moreover, despite the
aggressive implementation of all three prongs of the Washington Consen-
sus-liberalization, privatization, and deregulation-the political econ-
omy still lacked the competitiveness and transparency that such reforms
are meant to instill. Although private ownership was widespread, the
telecommunications and media sectors were run as virtual monopolies
and credit markets suffered from the same segmentation and large-firm
bias that had marked the ISI era. Finally, as reflected in Table 4 (Appen-
dix D), even less progress had been made with the remaining set of sec-
ond-phase tasks, which lay in the realm of distributional improvements,
wage gains, and human capital development.
Prior to the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Colosio, who
represented the modernizing wing of the PRI, it appeared that a viable
coalition could be crafted to move this reform effort forward. With
Colosio's assassination and the awkward emergence of the little-known
and significantly less politically skilled Zedillo as the PRI's handpicked
heir to the presidency, the prospects for forging a cohesive broad-based
reform coalition faded rapidly. This, of course, became a moot point
when the peso crashed and Mexico was thrown back into a painful auster-
ity program reminiscent of the De la Madrid period. Rather than a pro-
active reform coalition emerging from the modernizing ranks of the PRI,
27. JONATHAN HEATH, MEXICO AND THE SEXENIO CURSE: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCES-
SIONS AND ECONOMIC CRISES IN MODERN MEXICO 39-41 (1999).
28. Manual Pastor Jr. & Carol Wise, The Politics of Second-Generation Reform, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 34 (1999).
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the Zedillo team reverted to a reactive stance with multilateral lenders
and demands from the domestic opposition driving economic policy. For
example, pressures from the PAN and its business constituents resulted in
the articulation of a new industrial policy and some modest support for
small firms. Similarly, the kinds of poverty-related concerns that the
PRD championed eventually led to the revamping of social policy along
less partisan lines.
The financial crisis played into the electorate's worst fears, as 1995 saw
an inflation rate of 52 percent, a loss of 6.2 percent of GDP (9 percent in
per capita terms), a burst of unemployment, and a 25 percent spike in
non-performing loans. The PRI's myth of future prosperity finally had
been laid to rest, as consumer debt exploded to unseen proportions in
1995 and the working population's purchasing power collapsed under a
30 percent real adjustment of the peso. The irony was that, in the after-
math of the devaluation, the Mexican economy hit its stride. While a
mammoth $50 billion multilateral bailout package certainly provided a
cushion for economic reactivation, a more competitive exchange rate and
Mexico's guaranteed access to the U.S. market under NAFTA also con-
tributed to a surprisingly rapid turnaround.
The shift to a floating exchange rate in 1995 and the passage of new
legislation granting the central bank independence in setting monetary
policy also enabled Mexico to successfully weather the various external
shocks that began with the Thai devaluation of mid-1997.29 By 1996 man-
ufacturing exports (not including the maquila or in-bond industries) had
increased their share of that sector's GDP to 58 percent and continued to
grow by 30 percent annually. 30 This dynamic export expansion, in turn,
pushed GDP growth rates from 1996-2000 to their highest point since the
oil price boom of 1980. By 1998, foreign direct investment and portfolio
flows to Mexico had shifted places, as there was now $8 of foreign direct
investment for every $1 in portfolio flows. Overall, average annual GDP
growth rates from 1996-2000 were a healthy 5.5 percent.
But this dynamic economic recovery also threw into stark relief the
new winners and losers in Mexico's liberalization game. While some im-
provements had been made with poverty reduction under Salinas, the dis-
tributional data confirmed that the gap between the top 20 percent of
income earners and everyone else had widened considerably since the
implementation of market reforms (see Table 4, Appendix D). 3 1 The
1994 crisis stopped the trend toward poverty reduction in its tracks as the
29. DELIA M. BOYLAN, DEFUSING DEMOCRACY: CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY AND
THE TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE 215-19 (2001).
30. Originally launched in 1965, Mexico's maquila program allows duty-free imports
of capital equipment for use in manufacturing and assembly with the stipulation
that investors pay duty only on the value-added within Mexico and that 80 percent
of a plant's output must be exported.
31. Julio Boltvinik, Welfare and Poverty in Mexico, in CONFRONTING DEVELOPMENT:
ASSESSING MEXICO'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY (Kevin J. Middlebrook &
Eduardo Zepeda eds., 2002).
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resurgence of inflation prompted a new round of orthodox stabilization
measures. By maintaining high interest rates and a tight fiscal and mone-
tary policy, Mexican policymakers again reduced inflation to single-digits
by 2000. The implosion of a haphazardly privatized and corrupt banking
system in 1995 and continued stress related to a costly and prolonged
period of financial sector restructuring, hampered investment, productiv-
ity, and higher growth.
Thus, the other side of Mexico's recovery was further polarization of
the economy, as larger exporting firms with ready access to affordable
credit and strong ties to the U.S. market now towered over their smaller
and less competitive counterparts who produce for the domestic market.
This growing market segmentation, in terms of credit access and foreign-
versus-domestic orientation, had simultaneously fostered a continuous cy-
cle of capital accumulation at the top and a vicious circle of stagnation in
other parts of the economy. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) currently represent approximately 99 percent of the Mexican pri-
vate sector and account for 80 percent of employment and 50 percent of
GDP.32 Not coincidentally, the scenario just described-with investment
and real wages rising in the export sector but plummeting in the domestic
non-tradable market-mirrors the country's increasingly dualistic income
structure. Around 35,000 SMEs have survived by becoming exporters
and restructuring in ways that allow for better market adaptation, but the
more common story is one of small firms that are still struggling with the
basics (market research, product upgrading, the application of technology
to the workplace, etc.). 33
The plight of the more traditional SME sector is just one of numerous
examples where the electorate correctly perceived that the outgoing Sali-
nas administration, many members of which had fled the country amidst
corruption charges by this time, could have engineered a much less costly
adjustment. A related example was the crash of the banking system in
1995 and the exorbitant interest rates and credit choke-off that ensued
thereafter. The uncompetitive bidding that enshrouded the privatization
of the Mexican banks under Salinas reinforced the control of powerful
national financial-industrial groups over domestic credit markets. The
lack of transparency and proper regulatory oversight in the financial sec-
tor, and the federal government's willingness to spend some 20 percent of
GDP to bail out the big banks, not to mention those industrial and finan-
cial firms that owned them, was perhaps the sorest point of all from the
32. Unless otherwise noted, the data on Mexico's SME sector are cited from Jerry
Haar, Globalization and Mexico's Small Business Sector, North-South Center Up-
date, June 22, 2000, available at http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/new-
supdates/update37.htm (last visited June 8, 2003).
33. In the western state of Jalisco, for example, since 1994 local government incentives
in the way of low-cost land, subsidies for worker training, and other tax and regula-
tory benefits have garnered more than $2 billion from abroad for contract manu-
facturing in the electronics sector. This, in turn, has had an important multiplier
effect for local SMEs operating in the related retail and service sectors.
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standpoint of the Mexican public.34
A main sideshow, as Jorge Mattar and others have pointed out, was the
tremendous weight of the maquila sector in accounting for the country's
most dynamic trade and investment trends in the late 1990s. 35 Gross
fixed investment in the maquilas grew by 30 percent a year from 1993-
1997, with the result that this sector has been the main source of exports
and job creation. Even in the ultra-liberal NAFTA era, these export-
processing firms still operate in a more deregulated economic environ-
ment, one that continues to draw strength from its close proximity to the
U.S. market and from the wide gap between wages in the United States
and wages in Mexico. However, it is now possible to speak of a third
generation of Mexican maquilas that operate in more technologically ad-
vanced and higher value-added sectors (e.g., autos, computers, electron-
ics) and which co-exist with first and second generation plants involved in
assembly operations and industrial processing, respectively. Although
these higher-tech maquila firms are becoming more geographically dis-
persed, not just clustered along the U.S.-Mexican border, they still lack
sufficient forward and backward linkages with the rest of the Mexican
economy. Given that these companies had become a main impetus for
job creation and wage gains, there was clearly a role for public policy to
play in forging such links.
It was now up to Zedillo, who lacked Salinas' charisma and consum-
mate political skills, to design the kinds of remedial policies that could
reconcile these various economic contradictions and disparities, as well as
the highly conflicted social demands that accompanied them. Under-
standably, solutions offered for the very wealthy, such as the state's exor-
bitant outlays to rescue the domestic banks, further fueled the anger of
those who bore the mainstay of the adjustment burden. For the bottom
40 percent of the income pyramid that encompassed those who had no-
where to go but up, the administration replaced PRONASOL with an-
other demand-based social program (PROGRESA) that more carefully
targeted public spending toward health, education, and nutrition in the
poorer rural communities. 36 But PROGRESA did not gain momentum
until mid-1997, and in the interim there were no unemployment programs
or effective safety nets in place to help offset the loss of more than a
million formal sector jobs and a 12.5 percent drop in real wages in 1995
34. Timothy Kessler, The Mexican Peso Crash: Causes, Consequences, Comeback, in
EXCHANGE RATE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 43 (Carol Wise & Riordan Roett
eds., 2000).
35. Jorge Mattar et al., Foreign Investment in Mexico after Economic Reform, in CON-
FRONTING DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING MEXICO'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY
CHALLENGES 123-160 (Kevin J. Middlebrook & Eduardo Zepeda eds., 2003).
36. Families eligible for PROGRESA funding receive an income transfer designed to
increase the amount of food and visits to health posts of infants and small children.
PROGRESA school fellowships also are offered to promote attendance for chil-
dren between the third grade of primary school and the third year of secondary
school. Author's interview with PROGRESA's National Coordinator, Vicente
Arredondo, Mar. 22, 2001. See also NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF
AN ECONOMY 212 (2d ed., 1998).
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alone. As the drive against inflation pushed real interest rates to new
heights and social spending dropped by more than 12 percent in real
terms under a tight fiscal policy, the Zedillo team basically floundered in
offering the necessary relief measures, let alone anything that resembled
the second-phase reform package that voters had endorsed in the 1994
elections.37
The Mexican middle class, which was now evolving into the country's
swing vote (an increasingly independent bloc of constituents who proved
quite capable of shifting allegiances away from the PRI at a moment's
notice and voting almost interchangeably for the PAN or the PRD), was
caught uncomfortably between the widening poles of dynamism and stag-
nation. The wrath of this social segment was apparent immediately in the
first gubernatorial race that followed the devaluation, in the western state
of Jalisco, where the PRI lost a traditional stronghold to the PAN. In
terms of the PRI's short-term survival, earlier vote-buying options of the
kind witnessed in 1991 (PRONASOL plus a consumer spending spree
primed by personal credit card debt and a superficially strong peso), or in
1994 (lower interest rates plus the pumping of credit through the state
development banks), were out of the question. The Zedillo team did of-
fer some sweeteners for the middle class in the way of SME support
through a new industrial program called PROPICE and other related
programs, such as FONAES, which offered small interest-free loans to
micro-enterprises for up to two years.38 But as the 1997 mid-term elec-
tions approached, clearly, more would have to be done to compensate the
numerous losers who appear in Table 4 (Appendix D).
To the discomfort of the PRI's old guard, political spending under
Zedillo took the shape of another round of electoral reforms in 1996 (see
Table 2, Appendix B). Out of a tedious set of negotiations between the
main political actors, the PRI finally agreed to the following initiatives:
the selection of Mexico City's mayor through competitive elections; the
granting of full autonomy to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which
was placed under the direction of nine councilors chosen by consensus
amongst the various party representatives in congress; a more fair alloca-
tion of government funds earmarked for campaign financing; and inde-
pendent monitoring to prevent the PRI's manipulation of media access. 39
Together, these reforms finally leveled Mexico's political playing field.
Ostensibly, they were an extension of the PRI's ongoing democratization
strategy in that the reforms allowed for even higher levels of political
contestation, but not enough to fully unseat the ruling party. In essence,
Zedillo's deepening of political reform came to substitute for the second-
phase agenda that had been sideswiped by the severity of the 1994-1995
crisis. In terms of the immediate survival of the PRI, Zedillo no doubt
37. LuSTIG, supra note 36, at 210-11.
38. Author's interview in Mexico City with current FONAES director, Eduardo IbA-
fiez, Mar. 22, 2001.
39. For more detail on these 1996 electoral reforms, see Lawson, supra note 8 and
CHAND, supra note 4.
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spent this political capital with an eye toward mitigating the PRI's losses
in the 1997 mid-term elections and the 2000 presidential prize once the
economy had been fully reactivated.
The outcome of the 1997 elections confirmed that in order to bring this
PRI comeback scenario to life, the party would have to be remade into
yet another new image. However, at this point, neither Zedillo nor the
party's increasingly disgruntled rank-and-file had it in them to project an
image of repentant or remorseful economic reformers. Thus, the PRI's
ready-made reform coalitions of the past, mobilized from the top at a
moment's notice, could no longer be counted on to materialize in any
convincing manner. In all, the PRI lost two of the six state gubernatorial
races held in 1997 as well as its historic absolute majority in the chamber
of deputies. The PRI also was forced to politely concede to PRD candi-
date Cuauht6moc Cirdenas who won a landslide vote in the race for
mayor of Mexico City. The PAN emerged from the 1997 race with a total
of six state governorships but no substantial gains in the chamber of dep-
uties, whereas the PRD increased its share of deputy chamber seats from
about 14 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 1997. Although not as high as
the 1994 turnout, this election also drew a large percentage of the voting
age population. Most telling for the PRI was the decrease in the number
of districts now marked by single party dominance, which had dropped
from 242 in 1979 to 25 in 1997.40
In the lead-up to the 1997 mid-term vote, PRI candidates in gubernato-
rial races in the states of Yucatfin and Tabasco conducted off-putting cam-
paigns laced with fraud and violence. The PRI's negative campaigning
and scare tactics concerning the apocalyptic consequences of electing op-
position candidates was offset by the successful use of professional pol-
ling and image consultants by the PAN and the PRD. This, plus the
seemingly endless revelations of financial corruption-multi-million dol-
lar bank accounts surfacing in Houston, New York, and Zurich under the
names of former high-level PRI officials and the government's aforemen-
tioned multi-billion dollar bailout of those banks and industrial conglom-
erates that recklessly ran up bad debt-repelled the public all the more.
As the average remuneration in manufacturing fell by almost 40 percent
between January 1995 and July 1997, the middle class in particular would
continue to punish the PRI at the polls both for its errors of December
1994 and for the growing gap between macroeconomic recovery and
microeconomic hardship.41
In the aftermath of the 1997 election it became clear that the country's
political landscape had changed on par with the economic transformation
underway. On the domestic front, the 1990s had seen a weakening of the
Mexican presidency, partly due to the self-inflicted political shocks dis-
cussed here, but also as a result of the gradual decentralization of power
40. Klesner, supra note 7, at 37.
41. LUSTIG, supra note 36, at 211.
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and resources to the regions.42 This decentralization of power was partly
market-driven, as those export-oriented northern states that prospered
most under NAFTA were prompted to side with the more businesslike
PAN, while the poorer agricultural producing states in the south were
more inclined toward the PRD. Decentralization was also a conscious
policy of the Salinas administration, which devolved fiscal responsibility
for the provision of key public goods to the country's thirty-one states.
Although clearly launched with an eye toward shifting the control of
scarce fiscal resources within the PRI, the unexpected success of opposi-
tion parties at winning state governorships from 1989 on bolstered the
ability of these new PAN and PRD governors to access fiscal revenues
heretofore controlled by the PRI.
The PRI's 1997 losses also exacerbated the intra-party split that had
been festering since the mid-1980s between hardliners who blamed the
reformers and technocrats for their declining control over the nation and
modernizers like Zedillo who saw the reconciliation of democratization
and market reforms as the only viable path forward. The latter wing of
the PRI won out, as the 1997 mid-term setback became the prelude to the
historic transfer of executive power from the PRI to the PAN in the 2000
election. By adopting a campaign platform akin to the second-phase re-
form agenda that had produced victories in 1998-1999 for President Fer-
nando de la Rtia in Argentina and President Ricardo Lagos in Chile,
PAN presidential candidate Vicente Fox and his Alliance for Change beat
the PRI candidate, Francisco Labastida, by more than 6 percent.
The Fox campaign was doubly effective in that it built on the democra-
tization momentum underway since the 1997 election, and in doing so
attracted younger, largely urban, better-educated, and solidly middle
class voters. Still debatable is the extent to which the Fox victory re-
flected an endorsement of market reforms by Mexican voters despite the
economic roller coaster ride. of the entire post-reform era, or simply a
mandate for change. Public opinion was decisive in rejecting authorita-
rian politics, as the electorate finally saw the transfer of power to a demo-
cratic opposition as the more promising venue for realizing their civic
aspirations. Certainly a vote for Fox was more a pro-market vote than
anything else. Yet, as the following section will show, the closer specifica-
tion of Fox's winning second-phase platform, as well as a cohesive coali-
tion to implement it, remained elusive.
In the end, Fox took about 43 percent of the presidential vote, Labas-
tida around 36 percent and a tired Cdrdenas campaign took just under 17
percent for the PRD. In the 2000 congressional race no single party or
coalition of parties took a striking lead. The PAN and its allied Green
Party won about 45 percent of the seats in the chamber of deputies, the
PRI nearly 42 percent, and the PRD coalition finished with just below 14
42. Denise Dresser, Falling from the Tightrope: The Political Economy of the Mexican
Crisis, in ANATOMY OF AN EMERGING-MARKET CRASH 55 (Sebastian Edwards &
Mois~s Nafm eds., 1997).
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percent of the seats in the chamber. The regional distribution of votes in
2000 further deepened the pattern that had emerged so clearly in 1997:
Fox won by overwhelming margins in those northern states where the
electorate is best characterized as upwardly mobile, while the PRI contin-
ued to reap its strongest gains in states where the population was less
educated and still closely wed to traditional economic endeavors. There
were some signs of a healthy competitive showing by all three parties in
southern states that match this description, for example, Oaxaca and Chi-
apas. Otherwise, the 2000 election vividly showed the extent to which
Mexican politics had come to resemble two parallel two-party systems,
one which entails fierce competition between the PRI and the PAN in the
north and another in which the PRI and the PRD continue to duke it out
in other parts of the country (Guerrero, MichoacAn). 43
As the run-up to the 2000 election saw ever deeper conflicts between
Zedillo's technocratic wing and the party's traditional stalwarts and fur-
ther refusal of "dinosaur" state-level candidates to accept defeat in gu-
bernatorial contests, Zedillo basically had two choices: to close ranks and
succumb to the unsavory politics of the old guard or to stake out his posi-
tion in Mexican history as the president who oversaw the country's for-
mal transition to democracy. Make no mistake-Zedillo made every
effort to appease and compensate the political and economic losers
within the PRI, including his retraction of earlier promises to dismiss PRI
gubernatorial "winners" in Tabasco and YucatAn who had engaged in
open electoral fraud.
However, as a winner himself within the PRI, not to mention a likely
candidate for any number of high-profile international policy positions
abroad, Zedillo's strategic political calculations clearly shifted in favor of
posterity. In the end, he halted the PRI's practice of hand-picking the
presidential successor, subjected the party to competitive presidential
primaries for the first time, and gave the green light to televised debates
between the three presidential candidates. He also refrained from resort-
ing to the reckless political spending that prompted dramatic economic
crises at the end of each PRI presidential term in 1982, 1988, and 1994.44
By handing over a sound, albeit partially reformed, economy to the Fox
team and graciously accepting the PRI's presidential defeat in the 2000
race, Zedillo signaled that, while perhaps not up to this particular race,
the former ruling party was still not down for the count.
V. THE FOX CHALLENGE: A SECOND-PHASE AGENDA
WITH NO CONSISTENT BACKERS
Though spared the usual economic blowup that had long marked the
passing of the presidential torch every six years, Fox still inherited a bun-
dle of unresolved issues that quickly became part of his own "second-
43. Klesner, supra note 7, at 30-32.
44. HEATH, supra note 27, at 101-05.
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phase" programmatic agenda. From the past were the pending problems
of a peace settlement with the Zapatista guerrillas, the long overdue and
much needed tax reform bill (public revenues continued to stagnate at
just 11 percent of GDP, or 15-16 percent if oil revenues are factored in),
the need to forge ahead with privatization and/or the introduction of
competitive measures in the electricity, transportation, and energy sec-
tors, and the dire need to advance more quickly in rectifying the extreme
income inequalities shown in Table 4 (Appendix D). Less pressing, al-
though equally problematic, was the need to launch a deeper round of
reforms in the banking, judicial, and labor sectors and to move forward
with electoral reforms that tightened campaign finance rules and the
highly conflicted process still surrounding elections at the state and mu-
nicipal levels.
As with Zedillo's 1994 campaign, Fox too had phrased these challenges
in terms of second-phase market reforms meant to strengthen institu-
tions, assure competition and oversight, and more aggressively target a
wide range of human capital needs. Despite the lack of strong differences
between the PRI and PAN 2000 presidential campaign platforms, and the
healthy macroeconomic backdrop that prevailed prior to the election, the
PRI finally lost all credibility as the champion of political and economic
reform. Fox, although an untested political alternative at the national
level had the credibility but not the coalitional base or extensive party
machine necessary to hit the ground running with his reform promises.
Despite the electorate's high hopes for democratic change and the politi-
cal good will that Fox retained through his first year, this has yet to trans-
late into a cohesive reform coalition that can maneuver through everyday
party politics. 45
For different reasons, all three of the major parties have been wrought
with internal strife since the 2000 transition. The PRI's fall from execu-
tive power further emboldened the party's traditional wing, whose au-
thoritarian and populist tendencies are still painfully out of touch with a
more democratically minded and forward looking electorate. The PRD,
having resurged just once in the 1997 mid-term elections, has been mired
in ideological squabbles over leadership and disputes concerning political
strategy-winning elections versus promoting democracy. For the PAN,
which has had no qualms about pursuing a fairly straight electoral route
toward political liberalization, the 2000 victory has been bittersweet.
Apart from outright jealousy over Fox's success, the president's insistence
on dealing directly with the public, his appointment of an authentically
diverse cabinet, and his independent stance on numerous policy issues
has been a source of tension within the PAN since the campaign.
In essence, now that the political playing field truly has been leveled,
the Mexican political system is in the process of shifting from two parallel
two-party systems (the PRI versus the PAN or the PRI versus the PRD)
45. Fox's First Year: Still Popular, Latin American Mexico and NAFTA Report, July
10, 2001, at 3.
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to a competitive system proper. The difficulty that all three parties have
had in acting as such has meant that most of the Fox policy agenda has
either been stalled (e.g., privatization) or greatly watered down (e.g., in-
digenous rights bill, tax reform) as it winds its way through a Mexican
congress that is no longer a mere rubber stamp. Although a positive sign
for Mexico's democratic transition and a bright contrast to the era of PRI
hegemony, the Mexican congress has closely scrutinized and modified
every presidential bill sent down by Fox, thus compelling the president to
negotiate extensively.46 Yet, in the interim between the 2000 presidential
contest and the high profile gubernatorial and Chamber of Deputy races
slated for 2003, the reform trajectory could also be described as a collec-
tive action gridlock. With each of the three main political parties-the
PRI, the PAN, and the PRD-divided internally and feuding amongst
themselves, the very notion of coalition politics in Mexico is still a work
in progress.
In other democratizing cases in the region, the former perpetrators of
authoritarian rule have been disarmed (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) and/or
sent into exile (Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru). Not so in Mexico, where the
PRI still holds the largest number of elected seats in both the Senate and
the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, the preservation of congressional
term limits in post-transition Mexico has freed elected representatives
from the responsibilities of incumbency, while also inviting fairly obstruc-
tionist politicking, especially on the part of the PRI. The year 2002 pro-
vided a political respite of sorts, in that no major elections were held. But
the very possibility of capturing a congressional majority in 2003 was a
strong disincentive for once-omnipotent PRI politicians to engage in the
kinds of coalition politics for which the current situation clearly calls.
Considering all of this, what has Fox been able to accomplish? Albeit
piecemeal, and basically on its own, the current administration has made
some moderate inroads along the two main points of its earlier second-
phase reform platform: the deepening of political institutions and demo-
cratic norms and the articulation of a micro-level economic policy geared
toward bolstering the position of individuals and small firms in the Mexi-
can market. On the former, Fox wasted no time in advancing political
reforms that upheld earlier campaign promises to combat crime and cor-
ruption and instill much greater levels of transparency and accountability
into everyday life. Most prominent among these initiatives was the crea-
tion of a new Ministry of Security and Justice to replace the corruption-
infested attorney general's office and take over the policing duties of the
PRI-permeated Interior Ministry. The Ministry of the Comptroller and
Administrative Development was also scrapped and replaced with a new
Government Audit Office. 47 Other measures, such as the Law of Peo-
46. Denise Dresser, Mexico: From PRI Predominance to Divided Democracy, in CON-
STRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA (Jorge Domfnguez &
Michael Shifter eds., 2003).
47. This section draws on various issues of Country Report: Mexico, EIU Country Re-
port, July 2000 to July 2001.
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pie's Savings and Credit, will regulate financial intermediaries that focus
on low-income groups and a new Stock Market Law will similarly protect
small investors and seek to limit insider trading.
Those political reforms that dig much deeper with regard to Mexico's
democratic transition, including the highly contested indigenous rights
bill and the need for yet another generation of electoral reforms, will take
much longer to hammer out in congress. The indigenous rights bill was
the first piece of legislation that the Fox administration sent to the con-
gress. The president's strategy basically has been to concede to the
Zapatista's demands. The problem is that these gestures of collegiality
toward the Zapatistas are not shared by the more conservative elements
within Fox's own party. For once, the PRD backed the president on this
particular issue, but the PRI's position on indigenous rights has wavered
erratically. An indigenous rights bill was passed by congress in April
2001, but the content did not meet the desire of indigenous groups to
establish autonomy in local political matters, including justice, land, and
natural resource rights, and such autonomy was made precarious by con-
gressional insistence that it could be usurped when it conflicts with fed-
eral law. As a result, there is continuing discord among the major parties
about how to make peace and achieve progressive reform in this area.
On the economic policy front, the basically laissez-faire industrial strat-
egy that Fox inherited from the Zedillo administration has remained in
place, but with a greater allocation of resources and a more explicit em-
phasis on the development of SMEs. In this regard, the Fox team has also
staked out a more active role in targeting resources toward firms with
strong potential to participate in those higher value-added export activi-
ties that now define Mexico's transfomation under NAFTA. For exam-
ple, various SME promotion efforts (e.g., programs such as PROPICE,
COMPITE, CRECE) are now consolidated under one main office (CIPI)
in the Ministry of Economy (formerly SECOFI), which itself has been
assigned an unprecedented mandate to focus on microeconomic restruc-
turing, including a doubling of its share of the federal budget.48
The goal now is to reach at least 10 percent of those firms in need of
support by the end of the Fox term. Apart from offering assistance in
such areas as technology upgrading, skills training, and diagnoses for im-
proving efficiency, the Fox micro-strategy also commits to greater ac-
countability in the allocation of credit to SMEs. In particular, the current
reform package demands much higher levels of transparency from those
development banks that are the main conduits for credit access by smaller
firms. It will be more difficult for these banks to return to old practices of
bending the rules or playing favorites, as they will now be subject to ex-
ternal audits and to public disclosure of all aspects of their ongoing loan
48. Fox's Trade Plan to Focus on Smaller Firms, Mexico & NAFFA Report, Dec. 12,
2000, at 1. See also Dussel Peters (2002).
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The need to invest more vigorously in education, skills, and human cap-
ital, partly to position Mexico higher up on the value-added hierarchy,
was also a vocal theme in the 2000 Fox campaign. Once an afterthought
during the era of ISI and heavy state patronage, the sweeping liberaliza-
tion of the Mexican economy over the past two decades has made it im-
possible to ignore the country's steep education deficit. Most
troublesome is the disjuncture between a low-skilled workforce and the
rising skill premium, especially in those sectors that have been liberalized.
Thus far the most concrete plans to boost human capital include a pledge
to raise the average level of schooling from seven to ten years, and to do
so by deepening the inroads made by the Zedillo administration in shift-
ing a greater share of the education budget toward basic education.
Whereas this crucial category captured about 58 percent of the education
budget in 1990, it now accounts for about 66 percent and is slated to go
higher under Fox.50
Fox is stepping more gingerly with his plans to reform domestic labor
markets so as to encourage employment opportunity and mobility. For
example, the current administration is in the process of breaking the hold
of those unions with long ties to the traditional wing of the PRI, some of
which still control entire sectors through a web of corruption and coer-
cion. One strategy to weaken the power of these traditional unions in-
volves moving toward plant-level negotiations, mostly to avoid the sector-
wide rules that basically block labor market mobility. Union weakening
was also furthered by a recent Supreme Court victory that reversed an
age-old rule directing companies to fire workers who leave their unions.51
The upshot of all this is a potential lowering of wages, albeit for the pur-
pose of creating employment. Given the administration's distributional
goals and the lingering power of the country's labor bosses, this presents
both a contradiction and a political challenge that will require much
greater intermediation than any of the main stakeholders have yet to
display.
Despite these measured advances with Fox's second-phase agenda, ine-
quality continues to have a tenacious hold on the country, with current
trends confirming that targeted distributional policies must be acceler-
ated. Even in the short time that a more targeted distributional approach
has been in effect, there is evidence that selective anti-poverty programs
like PROGRESA are having a positive impact on the bottom 40 percent
of the income pyramid. The PROGRESA program, which now covers
49. Country Report: Mexico, EIU Country Report, Apr. 2001, at 17. The government
also intends to offer tax incentives to encourage SME export activities outside of
the maquila sector and to more vigorously enforce anti-trust policies already on
the books, but it remains to be seen whether these goals will be pursued in the
event that the congress remains difficult to traverse.
50. Authors' interview with Ignacio Chavez, Office of Health, Education, and Labor,
Ministry of Finance ("Hacienda"), Mexico City, Mar. 23, 2001.
51. Country Report: Mexico, supra note 49, at 15.
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some 2.6 million families in poverty-stricken rural areas, has spurred an
average annual increase of 20 percent on spending for basic needs. For
the first time, spending on poverty alleviation has now surpassed one per-
cent of Mexico's GDP. Although a little bit has gone a long way, the data
confirms that further reductions in poverty will require an even greater
allocation of scarce public resources and in order to foot this bill the Fox
government simply must raise tax receipts as a share of GDP.
Apart from the government's chronic dependence on oil revenues to
balance the books, the country's low level of tax incidence stems from a
combination of granting too many exemptions to big business and from
the fact that at least 40 to 50 percent of the workforce is now operating in
the informal economy. By definition, fiscal reform implies the drawing of
yet another set of lines between winners and losers, and this has rendered
the domestic debate especially contentious. At the same time, given the
right mix of tax measures, Mexico's future fiscal policies could infuse
greater dynamism into its distributional strategy and move the country
further in the Chilean direction: raising public revenues to aggressively
target distributional needs and broadening the social safety net in ways
that encourage productivity versus the old-style compensation. 52
The difficulty of getting down to serious business with a fiscal reform
bill in the Mexican congress was reflected in the mid-2001 decision to
postpone the vote on the tax package until the end of that year. In the
end, as its last major piece of legislation in December 2001, the Mexican
congress passed a tax reform bill that fell far short of the revenue projec-
tions that had been targeted since the testy debate over tax reform began
the year before.53 The congress did succeed in passing a uniform tax rate
of 35 percent for individuals and businesses in the top tax brackets, a rate
due to fall by one percentage point a year until 2005. But other proposed
measures collapsed, such as Fox's efforts to close special tax loopholes
and the passage of a uniform 15 percent VAT tax with extended coverage
to food, medicine, education, and healthcare.
The result has been a projected revenue increase of just one percent of
GDP and, as the budget deficit has already surpassed its current targets, a
panicky round of new taxes were levied, for example, on cell phones,
high-speed Internet services, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages. The cu-
mulative result of the long tax battle and generally unsatisfactory out-
come is that the political opposition succeeded in driving down Fox's
approval ratings and his overall standing in the public opinion polls; this,
of course, was a prelude to the drubbing that the PAN took in the 2003
mid-term race, where it lost fifty-four seats in the House of Deputies and
won only two out of six gubernatorial races. The PRD succeeded in
doubling its share of Deputy seats to 95, while the PRI raised its total to
52. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Chile's Takeoff- Facts, Challenges, Lessons, in CHILE: RE-
CENT POLICY LESSONS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 63 (Guillermo Perry &
Danny Leipziger eds., 1999).
53. Country Report: Mexico, supra note 49, at 8-16.
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224. This marked the first time since the Mexican Revolution that the
president's party failed to win the highest number of votes in a mid-term
race.
VI. CONCLUSION
After more than fifteen years of deep market reforms, the relationship
between politics and economics in Mexico is virtually the opposite of
what ascendant PRI technocrats had originally envisioned in the 1980s.
Rather than a dominant ruling party maintaining control through its ac-
commodation to a more competitive economic system, the challenges of
the latter have swept politics along with it. As is usually the case in such
transitions, the PRI itself was the last to realize the extent to which the
interplay between politics and economics had become a reciprocal feed-
back loop-a dynamic set of interactions that a stagnant old political
guard could no longer control. This tendency for voters to move on to
other parties and candidates once the economic house has been put in
order has been an integral part of the political economy of democratic
transition in post-debt crisis Latin America. The PRI, electoral reforms
and all, never expected to join step with this regional trend any time soon.
The challenges inherited by the Fox administration are real, as re-
flected in the political difficulties it has encountered in attempting to push
through its second-phase economic, institutional, and legislative reforms.
Not surprisingly, Fox has partially stalled at the same juncture where the
PRI finally lost its political footing. Now, with the standard bearers of
authoritarianism still happily running for office and periodically winning,
the uncertainties of reform completion in the post-stabilization era have
been compounded by the still protracted nature of the country's demo-
cratic transition. Thus far, Fox has compensated for this coalitional vac-
uum by appealing directly to public opinion, launching massive media
campaigns, and rallying hard-won ad hoc support for each and every initi-
ative discussed in this chapter. 54 However, the PAN's sizeable electoral
setbacks in the July 2003 mid-term election confirm that this improvised
short-term survival strategy has worn very thin.
The incumbent PAN party was clearly punished in the 2003 contest,
both in its losses within the House of Deputies and with the PRI's guber-
natorial gains. Mexico's increasingly sophisticated public opinion poll-
sters point to Fox's failure to deliver sufficiently on earlier reform
promises as the main cause. Nevertheless, the current juncture-eco-
nomic recession, political stalemate, and the slow-walking of the entire
reform agenda by the congress-is still considered too fluid and uncertain
to point solidly in favor of any single victorious party or bloc of parties
for 2006. The extent to which voters will opt for candidates that deliver
concrete results regardless of party affiliation is something at which the
opinion polls can still only guess. But unlike the past, the institutional
54. Dresser, supra note 46.
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machinery to support second phase political and economic reform-au-
thentic political parties, autonomous electoral oversight, an independent
media, and much higher levels of transparency, accountability, and effi-
cacy in the realm of economic affairs-is firmly in place. The average
Mexican voter may continue to reel from the changes wrought by the
country's economic overhaul and the unexpected uncertainties that have
surrounded democratic politics, but the odds are also stacked more heav-
ily in favor of that same average citizen than ever before.
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APPENIDIX A
TABLE 1
Electoral Support and Legislative Representation in Mexico, 1979-2000
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
Congressional Vote' Congressional Seats Presidential Vote
PRI PAN Leftb Other PRI PAN Left' Other PRI PAN PRD
1979 74.0 11.5 5.3 9.1 74.0 10.8 4.5 10.8
1982 69.3 17.5 5.9 7.3 74.5 12.8 4.3 8.3 77.4 14.5
1985 68.1 16.3 6.3 9.2 72.3 10.3 6.0 11.5
1988 51.1 18.0 29.6 1.3 52.0 20.2 27.8 - 50.7 16.8 31.1
1991 61.5 17.7 8.9 12.0 64.0 17.8 8.2 10.0
1994 50.3 25.8 16.7 7.2 60.0 23.8 14.2 2.0 48.6 25.9 16.5
1997 39.1 26.6 25.7 8.5 47.8 24.2 25.0 3.0
2000 38.0 39.4 19.2 3.3 41.8 44.6 13.6 0.0 36.1 42.5 16.6
a) Figures reflect percentage of valid vote
b) "Left" refers to the independent left and not PRI satellite parties; beginning in 1988, this
includes left parties in alliance with the PRD.
Sources: Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 302); Levy and Bruhn (2001: 101); Mexican Federal
Electoral Institute (IFE) website: www.ife.org.mx; presidential figures cited from G6mez Tagle,
(2001).
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APPENIDIX B
TABLE 2
A Chronology of Recent Electoral Reforms in Mexico, 1977-2000
Year Key Reforms
1977 Party system expanded from 4 officially recognized parties to 7; proportional repre-
sentation introduced in Chamber of Deputies: total number of deputies increased
from 300 to 400, of which the original 300 remained "uninominal" (elected by
majority vote within each of Mexico's 300 voting districts) and the new 100 seats
were to be "plurinominal" (elected according to the percentage of votes cast for
each party in each of five zones into which the country is divided for that purpose,
with an equal number of representatives from each zone).
1986-1988 Federal Electoral Code enacted; Chamber of Deputies enlarged to 500, with 300
uninominal representatives and 200 plurinominal; Senate terms changed from con-
current with the presidential sexenio to half concurrent, half starting at midterm
(concurrent terms reinstituted in 1993 reforms).
1989-1990 Constitutional amendments to electoral process; Federal Code for Electoral Institu-
tions and Procedures (COFIPE) issued, establishing the independent Federal Elec-
toral Institute (IFE); new electoral registry developed; tamperproof photo IDs
issued to voters; sanctioning powers of Federal Electoral Tribunal broadened;
"governability" clause enacted, guaranteeing majority of seats in Chamber of Depu-
ties to ruling party.
1992-1993 Amendments to Constitution, COFIPE, and electoral law promoting pluralism in
Congress (by doubling number of Senate seats from 64 to 128 and guaranteeing 25
percent of Senate seats to the leading minority party in each state, by preventing
any party from holding more than two-thirds of Chamber of Deputies seats, and by
repealing "governability" clause); establishing campaign-spending ceilings and
prohibiting political contributions by government agencies and officials, the private
sector, religious institutions, and foreign individuals and organizations; expanding
rules promoting equal access to media coverage of political parties; establishing
office for prosecuting electoral crimes and expanding sanctions on such crimes; cre-
ating double-blind random lottery to select 800,000 citizens to be trained and serve
as polling officials.
1994 Multiparty agreements reached on accountability (external audit of voter registry,
special prosecutor for electoral crimes, serial numbering of ballot stubs); Citizen
Counselors on IFE General Council (proposed by parties not president, elected by
two-thirds majority in Chamber of Deputies, and given voting majority on Council,
while party representatives to Council lose right to vote on Council decisions);
acceptance of international "visitors" during federal elections; new voting booth
technologies; electoral registry (to be shared with parties monthly before elections);
expanded programs for ensuring reliability of vote counts; expanded free media
access to parties, monitoring of coverage by IFE, suspension of party-paid advertis-
ing and government promotion of PRONASOL or other public subsidy programs
20 days before federal elections; restrictions on government officials' political activ-
ity; replacement of over 400 electoral officials, including IFE Citizen Counselors,
having perceived ties to a political party.
1996 The Federal Electoral Tribunal is made an integral part of the Supreme Court,
which now becomes the final arbiter of Mexican election results: the Supreme Court
now reviews the constitutionality of election laws and decisions at the federal and
state levels, effectively shifting the control of such decisions away from the execu-
tive branch; liberalization of IFE, by removing all government agents from its man-
agement (the Ministry of the Interior had managed the elections since 1946) and the
appointment of an independent professional as its director, to be chosen by consen-
sus and approved by a two-thirds vote in the chamber of deputies; IFE's eight Citi-
zen Counselors become "Electoral Counselors," now barred from involvement in
party politics or government for three years prior to their designation, also chosen
by consensus and approved by a two-thirds vote in the chamber of deputies to serve
a six-year term; limits on overrepresentation of the majority party were set at 8
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percent of total votes; a more fair allocation of government funds earmarked for
financing the campaigns of all parties; independent monitoring to prevent the PRI's
manipulation of media access; for the first time, the selection of the mayor
("Regent") of Mexico City through competitive elections.
2000 IFE approved the establishment of commissions at local and district levels to
receive complaints and petitions concerning the practice of buying and coercing
votes; a special 30-member congressional commission was created to monitor all
levels of government to avoid the illegal misappropriation of funds in favor of a
given political party.
Sources: Jorge Alcocer V., "Recent Electoral Reforms in Mexico: Prospects for a Real Mul-
tiparty Democracy," in Riordan Roett, ed., The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 59; Jos6 Antonio Crespo, "Raising the Bar: The
Next Generation of Electoral Reforms in Mexico," Policy Papers on the Americas, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 7, 2000; Vikram Chand, Mexico's
Political Awakening (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), pp. 237-244.
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APPENIDIX C
TABLE 3
Macroeconomic Trends in Recent Mexican Sexenios
De la Madrid Salinas Zedillo
1982-1987 1988-1993 1994-1999
GDPGRO -0.9 3.7 3.1
GNPPCGRO -2.3 3.9 1.2
INF 83.7 33.3 21.9
PRIVGDP 12.3 14.4 15.7
PUBIGDP 7.0 4.3 3.3
INVEST 19.3 18.6 18.9
RER 131.8 93.2 87.4
TRADEBAL 9,423.7 -5,759.8 -2,916.0
CURACCT 1,305.0 -13,063.3 -11,793.6
FDI 1,806.5 3,478.2 10,899.1
PORT -124.8 9.667.5 3,989.7
DEBT 96,841.8 109,260.1 155,933.4
1987-1988' 1990-1991 b  1993-1994' 1996-1997 b  1999-200W
GDPGRO 3.1 4.6 3.2 6.0 3.4
GNPPCGRO 0.4 3.2 1.1 5.0 NA
INF 123.0 22.7 7.5 21.7 10.2
PRIVGDP 13.7 14.1 15.2 15.1 NA
PUBIGDP 5.1 4.2 3.8 3.7 NA
INVEST 18.8 18.3 19.0 18.8 NA
RER 127.2 93.9 74.0 91.7 74.6
TRADEBAL 5,699.0 -4,080.0 -15,972.0 3,577.0 -5,360.0
CURACCT 937.0 -11.170.0 -26,531.0 -4,891.0 -14,016.0
FDI 1,598.0 3,646.0 7,681.0 11,008.0 11,567.0
PORT 638.0 4,077.0 17,885.0 9,145.0 9,955.0
104,330
DEBT .0 109,245.0 135,968.0 153,528.0 161,500.0
a) Data represent average levels in each 2-year period surrounding presidential elections.
b) Data represent average levels in each 2-year period surrounding mid-term elections.
Sources:
GDP, GNP and debt taken from the World Bank's WORLD TABLES, CD-ROM, 2000, except
for 1999 and 2000 GDP growth and debt data taken from the March and April, 2001 Economist
Intelligence Unit Country Reports, and GDP per capita taken from Inter-American
Development Bank website (www.iadb.org).
Data on investment taken from Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries:Statistics
for 1970-98 Lawrence Bouton and Mariusz A. Sumlinski, available at the World Bank's
International Finance Corporation (IFC) website: http://www.ifc.org/economics/data/dataset.
htm.
Inflation, exchange rates, and payments calculated from INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
STATISTICS, CD-ROM, June 2001: except:
Trade balance and current account data for Brazil and Chile prior to 1975, Argentina prior to
1976, Peru prior to 1977, and Mexico prior to 1979 was obtained from the 1984 International
Financial Statistics Yearbook; Washington: International Monetary Fund.
FDI and Portfolio investment data for Brazil and Chile prior to 1975, Argentina prior to 1976,
Peru prior to 1977, and Mexico prior to 1979 was obtained from the 1994 International






Growth of real GDP
Growth of real per capita GNP
Dec. - Dec. inflation
Total domestic investment as a % of GDP
Private investment as a % of GDP
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PUBIGDP Public investment as a % of GDP
RER Real Exchange Rate (1990=100); calculated using period average exchange
rate, US WPI and domestic CPI
TRADEBAL Trade balance (mil$)= merchandise exports - merchandise imports
CURACCT Current account (mil$)
FDI Foreign Direct Investment (mil$)
PORT Foreign Portfolio Investment (mil$)
DEBT Total External Debt (mil$)
GDPPCGRO Growth of real per capita GDP
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TABLE 4
Distribution of Current Monetary Income in Mexico by Household
Deciles, 1984-2000
(Percent of Total Income to Household Decile)
Household
Decile* 1984 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1 1.19 1.14 1.00 1.01 1.24 0.92 1.11
II 2.66 2.48 2.27 2.27 2.56 2.22 2.40
II1 3.86 3.52 3.36 3.27 3.56 3.24 3.33
IV 5.01 4.56 4.38 4.26 4.60 4.33 4.32
V 6.26 5.76 5.45 5.35 5.67 5.47 5.47
VI 7.66 7.21 6.77 6.67 6.99 6.86 6.92
VII 9.68 9.02 8.62 8.43 8.78 8.76 8.65
VIII 12.42 11.42 11.22 11.19 11.38 11.59 11.29
IX 17.00 15.92 16.09 16.30 16.15 16.42 16.47
X 34.26 38.97 40.84 41.24 39.07 40.19 40.04
Gini
Coefficient** 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.50
* Households are ordered in terms of income (the lower deciles include the poorest, the higher
deciles the richest).
** The Gini coefficient is an aggregate measure of income inequality which ranges from zero in a
completely equal society to one in a completely unequal society.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica, Geograffa e lnformitica (INEGI), "Encuesta Nacional
de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares," Third Quarter, 1984, 1989, 1992 (CD-ROM); Third
Quarter, 1994, 1996, 1998 (1998 CD-ROM); Third Quarter, 2000 (www.inegi.gov.mx).
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